2017考研英語《經(jīng)濟學人》閱讀：在賬房的朝鮮領(lǐng)導人

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A Kim in his counting house

一位在賬房的朝鮮領(lǐng)導人

The regime suffers none of the consequences of itsmisrule

朝鮮政權(quán)沒有受到暴政所帶來的惡果

A powerful army usually depends on a strongeconomy. Not in North Korea. Per head, the countryhas more soldiers than any other: 1.2m out of a population of 25m. As well as a hugeconventional arsenal, it also has a dozen nuclear warheads and spends perhaps $3 billion ayear on a nuclear programme that involves rocket launches and nuclear tests—the latest tookplace last week, the fourth since 2006. Yet the performance of the economy over the pastfour decades has been little sprightlier than that of the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung, since he wasembalmed in 1994.

一支強大的軍隊通常依賴于經(jīng)濟繁榮。但在朝鮮卻不是這樣。如果算人均軍人數(shù)，朝鮮比任何一個國家軍人數(shù)量都要多：2500萬的人口中有120萬名軍人。除了常規(guī)的大批軍械外，朝鮮還擁有12枚核彈頭，每年花費大約30億美元在核項目上，其中包括導彈發(fā)射和核武器測試—就在上周朝鮮進行了最新一次測試，這是自2006年來的第四次測試。但是在過去的四十年里，朝鮮經(jīng)濟僅僅比1994年被防腐處理的“偉大領(lǐng)袖”金日成在位時稍稍富有生機一點點。

North Korea suppresses most economic data. But as far as we know, from the 1950s to the1970s its economy outgrew capitalist South Korea, as a Stalinist state marshalled all resourcestowards production. Today the North's per capita GDP is only one-40th of the South's—awretched $600 a year or so, by UN estimates. The blame rests squarely with the Kim dynasty'sruinous policies. Yet the regime of Kim Jong Un, the third Kim on the throne, pays nopenalty for the people's suffering. Rather, it funnels money to itself, the elites and the nuclearprogramme.

朝鮮封鎖了其大部分經(jīng)濟數(shù)據(jù)，但就我們了解，從上世紀50年代一直到70年代朝鮮的經(jīng)濟增長速度要快于資本主義國家韓國。這是因為作為一個斯大林主義國家，朝鮮那時將全國的資源都投入到了生產(chǎn)當中。如今朝鮮的人均GDP只有韓國的四十分之一。據(jù)聯(lián)合國估計，其人均GDP大約只有可憐的600美元每年。這直接歸咎于金王朝毀滅性的政策。。但是金王朝的第三代當權(quán)者金正恩的政權(quán)卻沒有為人民所受的苦痛付出任何代價。甚至，它還在為自己，為朝鮮精英層，為其核項目斂財。

In a recent paper for South Korea's Asan Institute, Nicholas Eberstadt of the AmericanEnterprise Institute in Washington, DC tries to estimate the scale of North Korea's economiccatastrophe. Given the paucity of data, Mr Eberstadt used “mirror statistics”: estimates of thecountry's trade divined from other countries' records. He then made adjustments forpopulation growth and inflation. It is no straight proxy for output, but useful nonetheless.

來自華盛頓特區(qū)美國企業(yè)研究所(the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC)的尼古拉斯·埃伯施塔特(Nicholas Eberstadt)在其最近為韓國峨山研究院(South Korea's Asan Institute)撰寫的一篇報告中試圖估計出北朝鮮的經(jīng)濟災(zāi)難的規(guī)模。由于缺乏數(shù)據(jù)，他使用“鏡像統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)”：也就是用與他國的貿(mào)易記錄來估計朝鮮的貿(mào)易量。然后他再根據(jù)國家的人口和通脹情況對估計出來的數(shù)據(jù)做出調(diào)整。得出的結(jié)果雖然不是朝鮮產(chǎn)出的直接指標，但是卻是有用的。

Mr Eberstadt found that North Korea's per-capita exports last year were no higher than at theirpeak in the late 1970s, while per-capita imports were two-fifths lower. North Korea's economicunderperformance is remarkable for a country that is neither a failed state nor at war, he says.

埃伯施塔特發(fā)現(xiàn)，朝鮮去年的人均出口沒有上世紀70年代達到貿(mào)易頂峰的時候高，人均進口則下降了五分之二。他還說:朝鮮經(jīng)濟既沒處在動蕩中,也沒處于戰(zhàn)亂中，但經(jīng)濟卻萎靡不振，這實在太不尋常。

What went wrong? The collapse of the Soviet Union, upon which the North had long relied forcheap machinery and oil, certainly hit it hard in the 1990s. Weakened by bad weather, centrallyrun agricultural production collapsed in the 1990s, leading to a famine in which hundreds ofthousands of people died. International sanctions in response to North Korea's nuclear bomb-testing have also hurt.

究竟哪里出錯了呢?朝鮮過去長期依賴前蘇聯(lián)低價進口給他們的機器與石油，上世紀90年代蘇聯(lián)解體對它造成了嚴重打擊。在同一時期，糟糕的天氣使由朝鮮中央領(lǐng)導運營的農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)產(chǎn)量猛降，饑荒襲來，致使成千上萬人喪生。由于朝鮮進行核彈實驗，國際社會對其進行制裁，這對其經(jīng)濟低迷也有影響。

But the biggest problem, Mr Eberstadt argues, is that North Korea has the worst businessenvironment of any functioning state: worse even than Cuba, Venezuela or Zimbabwe. It hasno property rights or rule of law, no legal private trade and a currency prone to confiscation:in 2009 the government wiped out small traders' savings by declaring old banknotes invalid andswapping only a few for new ones.

但是埃伯施塔特認為，朝鮮最大的問題在于該國的商業(yè)環(huán)境是所有運作正常的國家中最糟糕的，甚至比古巴，委內(nèi)瑞拉和津巴布韋還不如。在朝鮮沒有產(chǎn)權(quán)，沒有法制，沒有合法私營貿(mào)易，而且你的錢還很有可能遭到充公。2009年，朝鮮政府宣布舊鈔作廢，進而沒收了小型貿(mào)易商的積蓄，并只交換了少量的新鈔。

A striking feature of the North's economic decline is the quantities of foreign aid thataccompanied it. North Korea has a long history of shaking down donors—first the Soviet Union,then, after 1991, America and South Korea, and most recently China. The total amount oftransfers is impossible to quantify. But Mr Eberstadt estimates the sum from the North's twobiggest historical backers, Russia and China, by taking its balance of trade deficits with each ofthem as an approximation of net resource flows into the North—assuming that the surplus isa debt that will not be repaid. That surplus amounts to $45 billion, in today's money, between1960 and 2013.

北朝鮮經(jīng)濟下滑的一個很明顯的特征就是伴隨著經(jīng)濟下滑而增長的外國援助量。北朝鮮在敲詐援助者方面可謂是經(jīng)驗老道了。它第一次敲詐的是前蘇聯(lián)，然后在1991年之后依次敲詐了美國，韓國，最近一次則是中國。朝鮮接受的援助總量無法量化估計。但是埃伯施塔特將俄羅斯和中國(兩個歷史上朝鮮最大的靠山)與朝鮮的貿(mào)易逆差看成是流入朝鮮凈資源的近似值，從而估計出俄中對朝鮮的援助總量。這一方法的假設(shè)條件是將差額部分視作一項不用償還的負債。從1960到2013，這一數(shù)據(jù)換算成現(xiàn)值總計達450億美元。

The money seems to have helped the Kims live like god-kings and still have enough left over topay the army, the secret police and various suppliers of nuclear materials. Yet Rüdiger Frank, aneconomist at the University of Vienna, thinks that increased supplies of hard currency may alsohave helped the informal markets for food and basic supplies that burgeoned as a responseto the famine. These black markets are the single most benign transformation in NorthKorea in the past few years. Most North Koreans now depend on them for their livelihoods. Thestate usually turns a blind eye, since its central planning system, which is supposed toapportion goods, has broken down. Besides, the elites demand their cut.

這一大筆援助似乎讓金氏家族過上了國王般的生活，還剩下足夠的錢用來支付軍隊，秘密警察和各種核材料的供應(yīng)商。但是維也納大學的經(jīng)濟學家弗蘭克(Rüdiger Frank)認為硬通貨供應(yīng)量的增加也助長了朝鮮的黑市交易。為了應(yīng)對饑荒，這種供應(yīng)食物和生活必需品的黑市快速發(fā)展壯大起來。在過去幾年，朝鮮的黑市就是一場良性的變革。大多數(shù)朝鮮人依賴黑市來維持他們的生活。由于本來應(yīng)該起到分配商品作用的中央計劃系統(tǒng)崩潰，政府通常對此睜一只眼閉一只眼。另外，那些朝鮮精英們也想在黑市買東西時得到些折扣。

Some see in such markets the seeds of deeper economic reform. And Mr Kim seems keenerthan his father to promise prosperity to his people, and even a modicum of leisure. NorthKorea's capital, Pyongyang, now boasts a dolphinarium and a water park, and even a ski resortto its east. As high rises go up, the capital's fashionable sip espressos in upmarket bars.

有些人從這類市場中看到了深化經(jīng)濟改革的種子。并且相比于他的父親，金正恩似乎更加熱切的希望給他的人民帶去繁榮昌盛甚至給他們一點休閑活動。如今平壤新建了一所海豚館和一所水上公園，在其東邊甚至建了一滑雪勝地。隨著一幢幢高樓拔地而起，平壤的時尚飲品濃咖啡進入了高檔酒吧。

Yet the regime's old habits are unchanged. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the state issqueezing the donju, North Korea's new successful class of traders. According to DailyNK, anews source with informants in the North, donju are worried that they will be forced to handover hard-currency savings to make up for the “massive dollar bomb”—ie, the expensivenuclear test—that was detonated last week.

但是金氏政權(quán)的舊習仍未改變。民間傳聞，政府正在打壓donju。donju是指朝鮮新興的成功貿(mào)易商階層。據(jù)朝鮮新聞提供源“今日朝鮮”透露，donju擔心政府會強迫他們交出硬通貨儲蓄以此來資助“大規(guī)模美元炸彈”——例如上周進行的花銷不菲的核試驗。

In the absence of direction from the top, there are limits to how much can change. A new policythat seems to have been quietly rolled out from 2013 allowed farmers to retain 30% of a newproduction target, plus any excess over the target, to sell on informal markets. Yet localofficials are not distributing the promised shares, perhaps to make up a shortfall atcooperatives, according to a report by Radio Free Asia.

由于缺乏高層的指揮，改變是有限的。一項似乎從2013年悄然開始的新政策允許農(nóng)民保留新產(chǎn)量目標的30%。另外超出目標的部分可以留下拿黑市出售。根據(jù)亞洲自由廣播((Radio Free Asia))的一篇報導，地方官員并沒有給農(nóng)民之前所承諾的份額，這或許是為了彌補合作社產(chǎn)量短期下滑的影響。

Meanwhile, the few foreign investors brave enough to enter North Korea must contend with anunpredictable and predatory state. In November the biggest such, Orascom, an Egyptiantelecoms company that set up the North's first 3G mobile net- work, said that it thought it hadlost control of its joint venture, and has not been able to repatriate its profits.

同時，少數(shù)有勇氣進入朝鮮的外國投資者不得不與這個無法預測并且損人利己的國家作斗爭。其中最大的一家是埃及電訊公司Orascom，該公司在朝鮮建立了首個3G移動網(wǎng)絡(luò)。在去年11月，它宣稱自己已經(jīng)失去了對合資企業(yè)的控制，無法將其利潤匯回埃及。

China remains North Korea's lifeline. Most products for sale in the North's informal markets arefrom China. Last year North Korea sold over $1 billion of minerals to China, chiefly coal. AsChina's economy slows and the price of coal falls, the North will suffer. But the regime has asolution: putting its scant resources into military power. This serves as a “battering-ram forinternational extortion”, as Mr Eberstadt puts it. Alas, it seems to work.

中國仍然是朝鮮的生命線。北朝鮮黑市的大部分產(chǎn)品都是來自中國。去年朝鮮向中國銷售了總價值超過10億美元以煤炭為主的礦物。隨著中國經(jīng)濟的放緩，煤炭價格逐下滑，朝鮮將受到重創(chuàng)。但是金氏政權(quán)有一個解決方法：將其匱乏的資源用于軍事武器。埃伯施塔特將這種做法看成是朝鮮對國際社會進行勒索的一種強硬手段。不幸的是，這種方法似乎起作用了。

1.depend on 依賴于

例句:Industry and agriculture depend on and supporteach other.

工業(yè)和農(nóng)業(yè)是互相依賴、互相支援的。

2.take place 發(fā)生

例句:There have been innumerable books that have been written regarding the unusualphenomenon which take place in this area.

關(guān)于在這個地區(qū)發(fā)生的不尋�，F(xiàn)象已經(jīng)寫了無數(shù)的書。

3.lead to 導致

例句:A lack of prudence may lead to financial problems.

不夠謹慎可能會導致財政上出現(xiàn)問題。

4.according to 根據(jù)

例句:They will swap posts in a year's time, according to new party rules which rotate theleadership.

根據(jù)輪流擔任領(lǐng)導的新政黨章程，他們在一年后會輪換職位。